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ABSTRACT
We discuss the use of the Bayesian evidence ratio, or Bayes factor, for model selection in
astronomy. We treat the evidence ratio as a statistic and investigate its distribution over an en-
semble of experiments, considering both simple analytical examples and some more realistic
cases, which require numerical simulation. We find that the evidence ratio is a noisy statistic,
and thus it may not be sensible to decide to accept or reject a model based solely on whether
the evidence ratio reaches some threshold value. The odds suggested by the evidence ratio
bear no obvious relationship to the power or Type I error rate of a test based on the evidence
ratio. The general performance of such tests is strongly affected by the signal to noise ratio in
the data, the assumed priors, and the threshold in the evidence ratio that is taken as ‘decisive’.
The comprehensiveness of the model suite under consideration is also very important. The
usefulness of the evidence ratio approach in a given problem can be assessed in advance of
the experiment, using simple models and numerical approximations. In many cases, this ap-
proach can be as informative as a much more costly full-scale Bayesian analysis of a complex
problem.
Key words: Statistics; Bayesian methods.
1 INTRODUCTION
The apparatus of Bayesian evidence has been proposed as the pre-
ferred means of answering questions concerning model complexity
in astronomy (e.g. Trotta 2008). Astronomers commonly wish to
decide whether a given model fits a dataset adequately, or whether
there is a need for additional degrees of freedom. Bayesian methods
are attractive in this context because they expose any assumptions
or prior information being used, and permit a clear statement of
the questions that scientists actually ask of their data (e.g. Jaynes
2003). They have been used extensively in the difficult problems of
inference that arise in cosmology (e.g. Hobson et al. 2010), and also
in the complex, multi-parameter modelling needed for the discov-
ery of exoplanets (e.g. Gregory 2005). Astronomy is by no means
the only area of science where these methodological questions are
posed or where Bayesian methods are proposed as the solution; but
the astronomical literature on the topic raises some issues worth
treating in context.
Bayesian methods give a transparent framework for model
choice, in which it is necessary to define the set of competing
models explicitly and exhaustively; Bayes’ theorem then gives the
probability of any particular model being correct. Integrating this
Bayesian probability over the parameter space associated with the
models (as detailed below in Section 2) then yields an overall ratio
of odds for particular classes of models: the ‘evidence ratio’. The
requisite multi-dimensional integrations over the parameter spaces
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of the models present a computational challenge, and astronomers
have made contributions to the development of these techniques.
The refinement of Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods for the
evaluation of multi-dimensional integrals is an example (Skilling
2004; Mukherjee, Parkinson & Liddle 2006; Feroz, Hobson &
Bridges 2009). Numerical Bayesian are establishing themselves as
a default approach, via public-domain packages such as CosmoMC
(http://cosmologist.info/cosmomc/) and MultiNest
(http://ccpforge.cse.rl.ac.uk/gf/project/multinest/).
Accepting the evidence ratio methodology, some authors have
gone further and attempted to place a quality measure on future ex-
periments according to the expected evidence ratio values that they
are predicted to yield for given decision problems (Trotta 2007b;
Heavens, Kitching & Verde 2007). What has been missing from
this discussion, however, is an assessment of the statistical power
of the evidence ratio: different realizations of data for a given ex-
perimental configuration will yield different values of the evidence
ratio, and we need to know how often the method will discrimi-
nate correctly between models, and how often it will fail. This is a
frequentist view of a Bayesian tool, but there is no conflict: the evi-
dence ratio is a statistic generated from a dataset, so it is legitimate
to ask how it will behave under repeated trials.
We will discuss several examples where the evidence ratio can
be used for model choice, and we will examine the statistical varia-
tion that results from different realizations of the data. The variation
is considerable, and we argue that this is likely to be generally true.
This suggest caution in the use of evidence ratios, but it suggests
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that simplified methods can be used to compute evidence ratios and
check their robustness.
Notwithstanding these caveats, we do advocate a more
widespread use of the evidence ratio technique in astronomy.
Bayesian methods are currently usually employed on complex,
high-value problems; but astronomers are also interested in sim-
pler model choice problems where the Bayesian techniques have
much to offer and are much easier to use (at least in an approx-
imate way). It is feasible to experiment with these simpler cases
and get a good sense of the robustness of the method. Approximate
Bayesian methods may often be as good as is justified by the data.
2 THE BAYESIAN EVIDENCE RATIO METHOD
Suppose we have just two models H0 and H1, associated with sets
of parameters ~α and ~β. For data D, Bayes’ theorem gives the pos-
terior probabilities of the models and their parameters:
P (H0, ~α | D) ∝ P (D | H0, ~α)× P (~α | H0)× P (H0) (1)
and
P (H1, ~β | D) ∝ P (D | H1, ~β)× P (~β | H1)× P (H1). (2)
Here the priors are, for instance, P (~α | H0), the probability distri-
bution of the parameters given model H0, multiplied by the prior
probability of the model class H0 itself. We can often avoid the
(common) normalizing factor required in these equations. It di-
vides out whenever we take the ratio to form relative probabilities
or ‘odds’.
The restriction to two models is not fundamental. Often H0 is
the ‘null’ or default hypothesis and is relatively simple and well un-
derstood. It is vital that H1 be reasonably comprehensive, covering
a range of possibilities, as otherwise the evidence ratio formalism
may result in high odds in favour of one of the models when both
are a poor fit.
The term ‘model’ can commonly be applied to each distinct
point in parameter space, but a distinct question is how reasonable
a given class of model is in the face of some data. When we discuss
‘model selection’, we are thus interested in the general viability
of H0 or H1, irrespective of the exact value of their parameters.
Integrating out the parameters gives the posterior probabilities of
H0 and H1, conditional on the data. The ratio of these probabilities
is the posterior odds, O:
O ≡ P (H1 | D)
P (H0 | D) =
∫
P (D | H1, ~β)P (~β | H1) d~β∫
P (D | H0, ~α)P (~α | H0) d~α
×P (H1)
P (H0)
.(3)
We assume that our set of possible models is exhaustive, so that
P (H1 | D) + P (H0 | D) = 1, the probability of H0 is
P (H0 | D) = 1
1 +O . (4)
For more than two models, this does not hold, but O always gives
the relative probabilities of any two models.
The odds ratio O updates the prior odds on the models,
P (H1)/P (H0), by a factor that depends on the data:
(Posterior odds) = (evidence ratio)× (prior odds), (5)
or
O = E × PO, (6)
where the definition of the evidence ratio E involves integrals over
the likelihood function times the priors on the parameters:
E =
∫
L(~β | H1)P (~β | H1) d~β∫
L(~α | H0)P (~α | H0) d~α
. (7)
The priors have to be properly normalized and may be quite dif-
ferent for H0 and H1. If the models in question are also hard to
calculate, the computational problem is large.
A decision about which model to prefer thus requires both the
evidence ratio and the prior ratio. The prior ratio is often taken as
unity, but this is not always justified. For example, one might be
reluctant to accept (say) H1 with 100 free parameters if H0 had
no free parameters. The evidence ratio contains a different penalty
for unnecessary complexity in the models: models are penalized if
a small part of their prior parameter range matches the data. This
is often called the Ockham ‘factor’ (e.g. p348 of Mackay 2003),
although it is not usually an explicit multiplicative penalty based
on the number of parameters.
In this paper, we will always take the prior ratio to be unity,
in the interests of brevity. This allows us in our examples to use
‘evidence ratio’ and ‘odds’ interchangeably, the latter being often
more illuminating.
The roles of the priors on the parameters, and the Ockham
penalty, have been extensively discussed. Recent examples include
Trotta (2008) and Niarchou, Jaffe & Pogosian (2004). In hard prob-
lems, the prior and the likelihood can be of similar importance in
determining the value of the integral, and their product may be
multi-peaked or otherwise pathological.
Many interesting cases are however much easier. The first ex-
amples we will discuss can be solved analytically. More generally,
if our data are informative, the likelihood function may be consider-
ably narrower than the prior. The priors can then be approximated
by constants over the relevant range of the parameters in the evi-
dence integrals. Furthermore, in simple cases the integrand may be
close to Gaussian around its peak, in which case the consequent
integration of a multivariate Gaussian can be done analytically:
∫
L(~α)P (~α) d~α ≃ (2π)
m/2√
| det(H) |
L(~α∗)P (~α∗), (8)
where ~α∗ is the value at the peak of the likelihood,H is the Hessian
matrix of second derivatives of the log of the likelihood at the peak,
and m is the number of parameters. This equation is known as the
Laplace approximation, or the method of steepest descent (see e.g.
p341 of Mackay 2003).
The integration then reduces to the less laborious task of find-
ing the maximum posterior probability, and evaluating the matrix
H. AveragingH over many realizations of the data yields the Fisher
matrix, which may be inverted to yield an approximate prediction
for the covariance matrix of the parameters (e.g. Tegmark, Taylor
& Heavens 1997).
The Laplace approximation may not be valid, since the pos-
terior may not be Gaussian near its peak, or there may be multiple
peaks of similar height. The applicability of the approximation thus
needs to be checked, at least via inspection of the posterior, or via
comparison with an alternative robust means of integration, such as
Monte Carlo. Monte Carlo methods can be also used to quantify
the robustness of the evidence ratio for different realizations of the
data. In addition to providing possible indications of multimodality
in the posterior, such an approach can also probe the stability of the
evidence ratio against systematic error at plausible levels.
c© 2010 RAS, MNRAS 000, 1–11
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3 THE EVIDENCE AS A STATISTIC
3.1 Repeated experiments
Posterior odds on hypotheses can be obtained from a given dataset
without ever having to consider whether the experiment could be
repeated. This is the well-known advantage of Bayesian reasoning
over the frequentist approach. Yet many kinds of experiment can
be and are repeated many times: observations in astronomical sur-
veys are an obvious example. In these circumstances, the Bayesian
evidence is a statistic that can be computed from a given dataset,
and it is hard not to wonder what value might have been obtained
had our dataset been a different realization of the experimental pro-
cess. Clearly if we know the likelihood function, which we must
do to compute the evidence, then we must be able to generate other
possible realizations of the data.
To make a decision based on the posterior odds, a threshold is
set at some value of posterior odds, such as the ‘decisive’ ln E = 5
value advocated by Jeffreys (1961). We may ask how often such a
strategy might lead us to make an incorrect decision. Conversely,
it is useful to know if a given experimental setup is likely to yield
data good enough to exceed the decision threshold and ‘detect’ the
more complex model in cases where it is true.
Suppose further that the evidence ratio turns out to be a ‘noisy’
statistic, in the sense that its distribution is very broad: in this case,
there is little point in devoting excessive effort in computing the ev-
idence ratio very precisely. Given that practical computations can
involve difficult integrations over spaces of very high dimensional-
ity, this is worth knowing.
The notion of ‘repeated trials’ needs clarification. In the sim-
plest case, the fluctuations in our data arise in the measurement pro-
cess, while the object or process we are observing has fixed param-
eters. A distinct case arises when we make repeated measurements
of objects or processes that are different on each repetition. This
often happens when we are observing samples and wish to make
statements about properties of whole populations. In this case, ex-
tra variance enters, often called cosmic variance. An elementary
example is the distinction between repeated (noisy) measurements
of the flux of a single galaxy, or a series of measurements where
a different galaxy is observed on each occasion. In the latter case,
we will have a prior distribution for the true flux of a randomly se-
lected galaxy, and the data we obtain in a given measurement could
be modelled by drawing a random number from this prior distribu-
tion, and then adding noise.
In dealing with the evidence ratio for repeated trials, we will
thus use the prior twice. The standard Bayesian approach regards
the data as being fixed specific numbers, and the prior enters only
when we average the likelihood function over the prior to obtain
the posterior probabilities. However, when we view the Bayesian
outputs as statistics, we have to treat the data as random variables,
whose distribution will depend on the values of the parameters for
which we have a prior. The probability distribution of the evidence
ratio involves the data, and so depends on the unknown parameters
that are the argument of the prior. We can eliminate these parame-
ters by a further integration over the prior, in effect, marginalizing
the distribution of the evidence ratio to obtain its probability distri-
bution independent of parameters.
3.2 Neyman-Pearson Analysis
Suppose we have the posterior probabilities or posterior odds for
our competing models. These will vary with different realizations
of the data. What do we do with these probabilities or odds? This
is not a question that can be answered by probability theory but it
can be illuminated by it.
One approach is to set a threshold in the odds, effectively tak-
ing one decision if our experiment gives posterior odds above the
threshold, and another if they lie below. This general idea was in-
troduced to classical statistics by Neyman and Pearson. A Bayesian
approach is to emphasize the posterior probabilities or odds as a
complete summary of our state of knowledge after the experiment,
and to resist further interpretation. There are parallels here with the
long history of controversy in classical statistics about the Neyman-
Pearson approach versus Fisher’s significance testing. Fisher rec-
ognized the utility of the Neyman-Pearson method in industrial ac-
ceptance testing but regarded it as too “wooden” to be useful in
the ill-defined and creative processes of science (Fisher 1956). His
detestation of Bayesian methods aside, Fisher would perhaps have
been sympathetic to the idea that posterior probabilities should be
carried forward intact through the processes of science; he took
much the same view of the results of his tests of significance.
We believe that binary choice between alternatives is a rele-
vant process in astronomy. The high cost and complexity of many
astronomical research projects requires a difficult decision on when
to commit to construction, which is irrevocable once made. More
generally, there is the whole issue of how a community develops
a consensus. The Bayesian ideal of a set of individuals each inter-
preting the evidence ratio in the their own way is hardly realistic:
rather, some pre-defined level of proof is needed – a threshold in
evidence ratio, in short. We will therefore apply a Neyman-Pearson
style of analysis to the evidence ratio, despite recognizing that this
is not a unique assessment of is utility.
Given the distribution of the evidence ratio E under two com-
peting hypotheses, we can ask how well the statistic performs. A
Neyman-Pearson analysis proceeds by defining a critical threshold
in the test statistic, say Ec. If E < Ec, we do not see any reason to
reject the simpler null hypothesis H0, and it is accepted. If E > Ec,
there is good reason to prefer the more complex hypothesis H1 and
H0 will be rejected. A common ‘decisive’ choice for the critical
threshold is ln Ec = 5, corresponding to odds in favour of H1 of
148:1 (Jeffreys 1961; Jaynes 2003). The common restriction to two
models is not critical, since we can always add the posterior prob-
abilities for N alternative models and consider this to be a single
alternative. This yields sensible answers, even in the case where
all N models fit the data about as well as H0: if N > 148, we
would then decide that there was decisive evidence against H0,
even though H0 fitted as well as any model. This simply reflects
our assumption that all models are equally likely a priori.
In the Neyman-Pearson approach, there are two ways in which
an incorrect conclusion might be reached:
(1) Type I Error (False Positive). H0 is true, but we are unlucky
enough to get a high value of E above Ec, so H0 is incorrectly
rejected. The Type I error rate is α ≡ P (E > Ec | H0).
(2) Type II Error (False Negative). H1 is true, but a value of E
below the threshold is found, so we fail to ‘detect’ the need for a
more complex model. The power is 1-Type II error rate and so is
P ≡ P (E < Ec | H1).
The power of the test is defined as the probability that we will cor-
rectly pick H1 when it is true – i.e. it is unity minus the probabil-
ity of a Type II error. There is the usual trade-off: if we conserva-
tively use a high threshold, we reduce the chance of a Type I error,
but we also reduce the power of the test because we are increas-
ing the probability of a Type II error. The power is less often dis-
c© 2010 RAS, MNRAS 000, 1–11
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cussed in astronomy, because alternative hypotheses are frequently
ill-defined. However, the notion of these alternatives is inherent in
the Bayesian method.
An example might be a case where we calculate a statistic, say
chi-square, to evaluate the goodness of fit of a model H0. From this
we may compute what is often called the p-value, the probability
of exceeding the value of chi-square we actually obtained, assum-
ing H0 to be correct. This is classical significance testing. In the
Neyman-Pearson method, we would fix in advance a critical value
of chi-square, corresponding (say) to p = 0.05. If we exceed this
critical level (by any amount) we reject H0; if we only have two
models, we then accept H1.
The Neyman-Pearson binary decision rule avoids the paradox-
ical issue of the relation between p and P (H0 | D), which has been
pondered by a long series of authors (Lindley 1957; Jeffreys 1961
and others cited in Berger & Sellke 1987; Sellke, Bayarri & Berger
2001). Paradoxes arise because we might think that if we obtained
a small value of p, it would follow that H0 was unlikely to be cor-
rect. While this is not a rigorous interpretation of the meaning of
p, successive authors have calibrated p for a range of models, and
found that p < P (H0 | D). This situation can be understood if we
select outcomes with given p from an ensemble of repeated experi-
ments in which H0 and H1 are equally likely. At one extreme, the
two models may be rather similar, in which case an outcome with
any p is equally probable on either model; if the models are ex-
tremely different, H1 might always yield p≪ 1, so observing e.g.
p = 0.05 could in fact provide strong reason to prefer H0. Thus H0
can be more likely than the value of p might seem to suggest, and
a calibration of p is required: without this, it is hard to know what
decisions to take on the basis of p. This discussion has continued
since Fisher introduced p and the idea of significance testing.
The Neyman-Pearson approach, by contrast, is quite clear
about how statistics should be used to take decisions and it is for
this reason that we analyze the performance of the Bayesian ev-
idence ratio using the concepts of Type I error rate and power.
Our analytical models are the same as those discussed before
(Lindley 1957; Jeffreys 1961, for example) and we reproduce the
p < P (H0 | D) effect. But this is not our focus; our interest is in
showing how the Bayesian evidence ratio performs, as a basis for
decision, under repeated trials.
An advantage of the Neyman-Pearson approach is that be-
cause there is a clear decision rule, the risks are also clear. For
example, if there is a cost of some sort associated with wrongly
rejecting the null hypothesis, then the threshold can be set to min-
imize this. As we shall see, however, this also affects the power –
and may affect the likely pay-off of correctly choosing the alterna-
tive.
The Neyman-Pearson lemma tells us that a statistic based on
the likelihood ratio will be the best one to use as a basis for deci-
sion. The evidence ratio is quite closely related to a likelihood ratio
and so this is another reason for examining its performance from a
Neyman-Pearson point of view.
We also note that the Neyman-Pearson approach can also be
assessed in a Bayesian way: we might ask, what is the probability
of (say) H1, given that I have just obtained E > Ec? This quantity,
P (H1 | E < Ec), is called the ‘positive predictive power’ in med-
ical literature. It is related by Bayes’ Theorem to the Type I and
Type II error rates, and the prior odds ratio on H1 and H0:
PPP =
ΘP
α+ΘP , (9)
in which α is the false positive rate, P is the power, and Θ is the
prior odds on H1. Evidently the use of the PPP requires us to set a
threshold in advance on our test statistic, much as in the Neyman-
Pearson approach. We might then pose similar counterfactual ques-
tions such as, if we have obtained E < Ec and we then choose H1
with probability PPP, what might our loss be if H0 is true?
4 GAUSSIAN EXAMPLES
We will now examine two contrasting Gaussian examples. In the
first, both priors are very narrow and the evidence ratio acts in the
same way as a classical statistic for model choice. In the second
we have one prior much wider than the other. The evidence ratio
method now diverges strongly from a classical alternative and the
role of the Ockham factor is apparent. In both cases we will see how
finite amounts of data reduce the effectiveness of decisions based
on thresholds in the evidence ratio.
We have N data values, Xi, which may have arisen via one of
two models:
(1) Independent drawings from a Gaussian of unit standard de-
viation and mean zero.
(2) Independent drawings from a Gaussian of unit standard de-
viation and mean µ.
As usual, we assume that these two possibilities are a priori equally
probable. This is a case where the two models are nested: model 1
is a special case of model 2 (µ = 0).
In astronomical terms, this situation might correspond to a
(one-dimensional) Gaussian source in the zero-background limit
(X-ray astronomy). The observed N photon locations are Xi, and
we wish to see if there is evidence that the source is offset from
some pre-determined position. As noted, there are various possibil-
ities one may wish to test. One is that the source is supposed to be
at one of two definite positions, both of which we know. Another is
that the source is either at one definite position, which we know, or
it is located ‘somewhere else’. Here we put a Gaussian prior on the
alternative position and so know the parameters of that prior (most
interestingly, the spread). We now deal with these cases in turn.
4.1 Example 1
The models H0 and H1 hypothesize that the N data Xi are drawn
from unit Gaussians of mean zero and mean µ respectively. The
evidence ratio E is then very simple:
− 2 ln E =
N∑
i=1
(Xi − µ)2 −
N∑
i=1
X2i = N(µ
2 − 2Mµ), (10)
where M is the mean of the N samples. Clearly M will be Gaus-
sian, of variance 1/N , under either hypothesis, and so the logarithm
of the evidence ratio is also Gaussian. This means that the evidence
ratio will have considerable scatter, provided Nµ2 ≫ 1.
Our decision procedure is to reject H0 (and therefore accept
H1) when E exceeds some threshold Ec. This occurs when M ex-
ceeds
M0 =
ln Ec +Nµ2/2
Nµ
. (11)
We make a Type I error (incorrectly rejectingH0) whenM exceeds
this threshold and H0 is true. The probability of this is the proba-
bility that M exceeds Mc when M is a Gaussian of mean zero and
variance 1/N , which is
c© 2010 RAS, MNRAS 000, 1–11
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Figure 1. The probability distributions of ln E under H0 (left) and H1
(right), assuming N = 4 and µ = 1. For the arbitrary choice lnEc = 1,
the dark shaded area gives the Type I error rate, and the light shaded area
gives the Type II error rate.
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Figure 2. Parametric curves of the power of the evidence ratio test for ex-
ample 1, as a function of the probability of Type I error, with the parameter
being the evidence ratio. Curves are shown for µ = 1 and N = 2 (low-
est curve), with N increasing for each curve by a factor 2. The dots show
evidence ratios (green, blue, red) of e2, e3 and e4.
P (type I) =
1
2
(
1− erf
(
(2 ln Ec +Nµ2
2
√
2Nµ
))
(12)
We make a Type II error (incorrectly failing to reject H0) when M
is less than Mc and H1 is true. The probability of this is
P (type II) =
1
2
(
1− erf
(
(−2 ln Ec +Nµ2
2
√
2Nµ
))
(13)
Fig. 1 illustrates the possibilities. From these expressions we can
calculate curves of power versus Type I error level, in which µ and
N are parameters. These are shown in Fig. 2.
In a classical procedure we would base our acceptance of H0
on whether M differs significantly from zero. Specifically, we re-
ject H0 if M > t/
√
N where t is a parameter analogous to Ec,
which we choose to determine the trade-off between power and
Type I error. We find that this test is identical in form to the one
based on the evidence ratios (so the curves are the same in Fig. 2).
However, standard values of ln Ec give very low powers and very
conservative Type I error rates, as the figure shows. We can see why
from the interesting relationship between the two approaches:
ln Ec = µ
(√
Nt− Nµ
2
)
. (14)
Suppose we design an experiment to choose between H0
(µ = 0) and H1 (µ = 1), based on the common decisive thresh-
old ln Ec = 5. Once we have obtained our data and calculated the
evidence ratio E , we pick H1 if E > Ec and expect the odds on
this being the correct choice to be 148 to 1. Consider for simplicity
the case N = 1: the critical t for this example is then 5.5 and we
would need a 5.5-sigma result to rejectH0. This a very conservative
procedure: the Type I error rate is 10−7.7 and the power is a pal-
try 10−5.5. The analysis is warning us that setting the critical odds
at the apparently desirable 148 to 1 means we will rarely exceed
the evidence ratio threshold. As with any classical test statistic, it
makes no sense to set a critical value which will hardly ever be ex-
ceeded for the amount of data available. This makes it inevitable
that H0 will not be rejected. We need more data, or a less stringent
acceptance procedure, as Fig. 2 shows.
Suppose we carried out this experiment and obtained a single
datum that did indeed yield t > 5.5, ln Ec > 5. Formally we should
choose H1 – but common sense tells us that our datum is next to
impossible under either H0 or H1. It would be more reasonable
to look for some missing hypothesis H2, and certainly prudent to
check the goodness of fit of the apparently-favoured H1. We will
make similar comparisons for our other examples.
4.1.1 ROC and AUC
The plot of power against Type I error rate is sometimes known
as the Receiver Operating Characteristic, or ROC, the name aris-
ing from its origin in radar. It is used a good deal in medicine (e.g.
Zweig & Campbell 1993). A useful quantity could be the integral
under the ROC curve, known as the AUC (Area Under the Curve).
In our application, it is not difficult to show that the AUC is the
probability that the evidence ratio, assuming H1, exceeds the ev-
idence ratio, assuming H0. This condenses the ROC into a single
number, which for our examples is quite close to unity. This may
be a useful compression in some cases, but it does lose the possibil-
ity of ascribing weight to the degree by which the evidence ratios
exceed each other.
4.2 Example 2
In this example, the null hypothesis H0 remains that the random
variables Xi are drawn from a Gaussian of mean zero and unit
variance. The alternative hypothesis H1 is that the Xi are drawn
from a Gaussian of mean µ and unit variance. However, in this case
we do not know µ – we assume that the prior on µ is Gaussian,
of mean zero and known standard deviation σ. This formulation
poses the question, ‘is µ zero or is it non-zero but with a restricted
range of possibilities?’ The models are nested because if σ = 0
then H1 reduces to H0. Hence H1 is a model that requires an extra
free parameter. A model similar to this was considered by Jeffreys
(1961), who examined the contrast between p-value and posterior
probability of H0.
This example shows a standard technique for creating a rea-
sonably comprehensive alternative hypothesis – the use of a hierar-
chical model (Gelman & Hill 2007). Here the introduction of one
extra parameter (σ) gives us a wide range of possible alternatives
for µ, which in the previous example we had to set case-by-case.
The evidence ratio, in the sense H1/H0, is now
c© 2010 RAS, MNRAS 000, 1–11
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E =
∫
exp
(
−∑
i
(Xi − µ)2/2
)
exp
(
−µ2/2σ2
)
dµ√
2πσ exp
(
−∑
i
(Xi)2/2
)
.
(15)
The likelihood term depends on µ but not σ, which enters through
the prior on µ. The ratio simplifies to
E = 1
(Nζ)1/2σ
exp
[(∑
i
Xi
)2
/2Nζ
]
(16)
where
ζ ≡ 1 + 1/Nσ2, (17)
which tends to unity as σ becomes large. Evidently, the distribution
of E under repeated trials will be determined by the distribution of∑
i
Xi, which will be Gaussian under either H0 or H1.
To calculate this in detail, we define:
y ≡ ζ ln E + ζ
2
ln(Nζσ2), (18)
which becomes
y =
(∑
i
Xi
)2
/ 2N. (19)
Under H0, the sum is Gaussian of mean zero and variance N , so
that y (and hence ln E ) is a χ2 variable with one degree of freedom.
Its density is
dP/dy = (πy)−1/2 exp(−y), (20)
This immediately tells us that ln E is a χ2 variable and so E will
have considerable scatter, affecting the power of the test.
The case of Type II error requires a little more thought. In this
case, the Xi are Gaussian with mean µ, and so equation (16) can
only give us the distribution of E conditional upon µ, which we do
not know. It is natural however to marginalize over the prior on µ
to obtain an unconditional distribution for E . This is an important
conceptual step in the analysis, putting the prior spread in a param-
eter, µ, on the same footing as spread in the data. The result is that
the distribution of E is broadened beyond what would be the case
if we considered repeated trials in which only measuring error (the
distribution around fixed µ) caused fluctuations in the result. We
see no alternative to this conclusion: the existence of a prior on µ
means that it must be treated as a random variable, whose value is
undetermined before we perform an experiment. The larger the un-
certainty in µ, the larger the scatter in the values of E that we can
obtain.
It follows that the distribution of E depends on the distribution
of
∑
Xi marginalized over the prior. For H1 we then find:
dP/dz = (πz)−1/2 exp(−z) (21)
with z ≡ y/(1 + Nσ2). Returning to the Neyman-Pearson anal-
ysis, since P (E)dE = P (y)dy we can change to our convenient
variable y and integrate over Gaussians to obtain
P (type I) =
∫
∞
Ec
P (E|model 1) dE = 1− erf (√yc) (22)
and
P (type II) =
∫
Ec
0
P (E|model 2) dE = erf (√zc) (23)
with zc ≡ yc/(1+Nσ2). The threshold yc is related to our choice
of critical Ec via equation (18).
Fig. 3 shows curves for the power versus significance level
0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02
Type I error rate
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Po
w
er
Figure 3. A plot of the power of the evidence ratio test for example 2, as
a function of the probability of Type I error. Curves are shown for Nσ2 =
2 (lowest curve), increasing for each curve by a factor 2. The dots lie at
evidence ratios of e2(green), e3 (blue) and e4 (red).
as a function of Nσ2. This parameter expresses the dependence of
test performance on the amount of data (N ) and the prior degree
of difference between the proposed models (σ). In this plot, it is
remarkable where standard choices of critical evidence ratio lie.
Take ln Ec = 5 for definiteness: at, say, Nσ2 = 8 we find the
significance level to be 2 × 10−4 and the corresponding power to
be 0.19.
In words, this means that if we require the odds on H1 to be
148 to 1 or stronger, then we will reject H0 incorrectly only one
time out of 5000 trials, and we will pick H1 when we should only
one time out of 5 trials. This is an excessively conservative decision
procedure and parallels what we saw in the first example.
Evidently, we will need much smaller critical odds than 148
to 1 to get reasonable performance from this test. To re-emphasize,
this is a function of the chosen critical evidence ratio, not the form
of the test, which is intuitive. The problem is that ln E is noisy for
small amounts of data and cannot sustain such decisive tests as are
implied by ln Ec = 5 (for example). Fig. 4 illustrates this point.
This test might intuitively be derived without the evidence ra-
tio, focusing on the test statistic (
∑
i
Xi)
2
, where the square en-
ters to allow for the possibility that the actual, non-zero µ can be
be of either sign. For simplicity, consider the form y we defined
before, which is chi-square distributed (see equation 19). A simple
test could be, reject H0 if y > yc, where the critical yc corresponds
to some desired significance level or probability p of Type I error.
The power of this proposed test is conditional upon µ. Marginaliz-
ing out µ with the Gaussian prior, as before, the forms of the power
and significance level turn out to be identical to those based on the
evidence ratio test. So the test is natural enough; the difficulty arises
in choosing a sensible value for the critical evidence ratio. This is
exactly the same difficulty that occurs in choosing the significance
level in any classical test.
It might seem even more ‘natural’ for this problem to choose∑
X2i as a test statistic. Working through the Neyman-Pearson
analysis in this case is not possible analytically, as non-central chi-
square distributions arise. However, a numerical analysis shows
that this ‘natural’ procedure only performs better than the evidence
ratio for small Nσ2 < 3. So the evidence ratio method is not triv-
ially intuitive.
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Figure 4. A plot of the power and significance levels of the evidence ratio
test for example 2, as a function of the critical evidence ratio. Curves are
shown for Nσ2 = 2 (lowest curve), increasing for each curve by a factor
2. Significance level is in blue, power in red. The changing slopes of the
significance lines are real.
4.3 Conclusions from the Gaussian examples
These simple examples show that the odds that we calculate from
the evidence ratio may not be useful for making decisions if we
take account of statistical variations over an ensemble of datasets.
A decisive threshold of ln E = 5 can in many cases be exceeded
only a small fraction of the time when H1 is true, even when such a
value is effectively impossible under H0. In other words, the test is
extremely safe (very hard to reject the null hypothesis incorrectly),
but lacking in power (little ability to detect the alternative). This
asymmetry between type I and type II performance seems unde-
sirable, particularly because the problem is set up so that there are
only two possibilities. If H0 is clearly inconsistent with the data,
then H1 must be correct according to the problem as given – even
if the Bayesian evidence ratio is only moderate. Again, this sug-
gests that we should be free to challenge the statistical formulation
and conclude that neither H0 nor H1 are correct. Fisher might have
regarded this as the correct (less “wooden”) approach.
5 A LINE FITTING EXAMPLE
We now consider two more complex examples, where we are inter-
ested in which of two models is a better fit to spectral line data. We
will use Monte Carlo simulation to assess the statistical scatter be-
tween different realizations of the data. We will consider two cases,
one ‘nested’ (whether there is an extra component to a spectral line)
and one not nested (whether a line has a Gaussian or Lorentzian
profile).
Suppose we are trying to decide if a spectral feature is a sin-
gle Gaussian (the null hypothesis H0) or two Gaussians, of equal
width, known separation, but unknown height ratio (the alternative
hypothesis H1). This is a nested model because if the height ratio is
zero, H1 reduces to H0. The relevant parameters are the baseline;
the height, width, and centre of the main line; and the height ratio
for the subsidiary line. The models are:
H0 : y = α1 + α2 exp
(
− 1
2α2
3
(x− α4)2
)
(24)
H1 : y = β1 + β2 exp
(
− 1
2β2
3
(x− β4)2
)
+β5 exp
(
− 1
2β2
3
(x− β4 − 3β3)2
)
. (25)
The extra feature is located a known three standard deviations away
from the main one. We also treat the noise levels as free parameters
to be determined from the data; this is realistic because we may not
know the noise level very well. We again assume that each model
is a priori equally likely, and that the noise is normally distributed.
The models need priors on the parameters, which we describe later.
In the Neyman-Pearson framework, our decision rule for this ex-
ample will be: accept H1 if the evidence exceeds a critical value.
The Monte Carlo modelling process involves the following
steps, some repeated.
(1) To create the noise-free spectrum under H0 we take α1 =
β1 = 0, α2 = β2 = 1, α3 = β3 = 1, α4 = β4 = 0 in equation
(24). The noise-free spectra are sampled on a pixel grid of spacing
1/5 in the above units.
(2) The noise-free spectrum under H1 is created with the same
parameters as for H0 in equation (25) but the key parameter β5,
the strength of the satellite line, now enters. We will assume that
the prior for β5 is uniform between zero and 0.1, so we are looking
for a satellite line that we expect to be at most 10% of the main
line. The presence of this prior introduces a factor of 0.1 into the
evidence ratio; we assume that the priors on the other parameters
are the same for H0 and H1.
(3) To estimate the Type I error rate, we generate simulated
data with H0 assumed true, adding Gaussian noise. We define the
signal-to-noise ratio as the ratio of the peak level (unity) to the stan-
dard deviation of the added noise. We fit the forms for H0 and H1
to these simulated data and compute the evidence ratio in the sense
E = evidence for H1 / evidence for H0, using the Laplace approx-
imation. This gives the evidence ratio when the data are created on
the assumption the H0 is true.
(4) To compute the power, we need to compute the evidence
ratio using data generated data for the case where H0 is false. We
will do this by assuming that H1 is true. We generate simulated
data under H1 by adding noise to the noise-free spectrum under
H1. Choosing the random values of β5, the satellite line strength,
from its prior naturally marginalizes the distribution of the evidence
ratio over the range of prior assumed strengths for the satellite line
(the evidence ratio is a very strong function of this line height).
(5) We fit the forms for H0 and H1 again and compute the ev-
idence ratio. Examples of the fits under H0 and H1 are shown in
Fig. 5.
The use of the Laplace approximation is justified by examin-
ing the likelihood functions and finding them to be close to Gaus-
sian – a check that should always be made.
The trends of the evidence ratio with signal-to noise ratio are
plotted in Fig. 6, which shows the median and the interquartile
range for the log of the evidence ratio, plotted against the signal-
to-noise ratio. We see that the evidence ratio or odds for H0, if it is
true, do not get very big compared to the odds for H1. This is what
we expect from a nested model, as H1 can always do just as well
as H0, with only the Ockham penalty for extra complexity – not
severe for only one extra parameter. It follows from our decision
rule that the Type I error rate is quite low. Indeed, for the standard
decisive ratio of e5 = 148, the Type I error rates are exceedingly
small – the decision rule is very conservative at these signal-to-
noise ratios. On the other hand, clearly if H1 is true we will often
find values below the critical value and so the power is not large.
Ultimately we can trace this to the width of the prior on the satellite
c© 2010 RAS, MNRAS 000, 1–11
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Figure 5. Both panels show fits of Gaussians, where the bimodal model H1
is favoured at odds of 20 to 1. In the upper panel, the fit of the model under
H1 is shown, in the lower, under H0.
line height; we are too vague about what we are looking for to have
high power. This point arises again in the next example.
The utility of the proposed decision rule is summarized in Fig.
7, which shows the power and Type I error rate as a function of
decision threshold (the chosen critical evidence ratio) and signal-
to-noise ratio. This diagram is specific to the problem at hand, but
interesting points emerge. Evidently, the combination of the crit-
ical evidence and the signal-to-noise ratio determines where the
decision rule places one in the diagram. Standard decisive thresh-
olds like e5 result in low power and a very small Type I error rate –
less than 1/500 with our number of repetitions of the Monte Carlo
simulation. This may not be what is needed.
For comparison, we also apply a Bayesian Information Crite-
rion (BIC; see e.g. Liddle 2007). In our case this means we pick the
model with the smallest value of the normalized sum of squares
plus the penalty term ln(number of data points) × (number of
model parameters). The number of data points is the number of
spectral channels – evidently this number is somewhat vague as
not all channels are equally informative.
The BIC rule, while offering no choices, sits in a useful place
in the diagram for this relatively simple problem and is no worse in
power than the evidence ratio. Finally, we note that different deci-
sion rules (for example, accepting H0 if the evidence for it is bigger
than the evidence for H1) result in a different diagram.
For a second example, we consider trying to decide if a line
profile is Gaussian (H0) or Lorentzian (H1). Here we have
H0 : y = α1 + α2 exp
(
− 1
2α2
3
(x− α4)2
)
(26)
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Figure 6. The evidence ratio for the first line-fitting example, in the sense
evidence for H1 / evidence for H0, plotted against signal-to-noise ratio.
These results include the effects of the priors that are described in the text.
The red curve assumes H0 is true (no satellite line) and the black curve
assumes H1 is true. The central curve is the median and the flanking solid
lines are the 25th and 75th percentiles. 500 iterations were used at each
noise level. The horizontal lines mark odds on H1 that are even, 2:1, 4:1,
and 8:1.
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Figure 7. The power and Type I error rate for the first line-fitting example
are shown for signal-to-noise ratios of 40 (topmost line), 35, 30... The crit-
ical ratio varies along each line, with points indicating a critical evidence
ratio in favour of H1 of 2 (red), 4 (blue) and 8 (green). Grey points are for
the simple case of picking the model with the smaller BIC. At each signal-
to-noise ratio – β5 combination, 500 iterations were used. The Type I error
rates are therefore not reliable near 1/500 – the power should be zero for if
the Type I error rate is zero, but the curves are too steep near the origin to
resolve properly with Monte Carlo.
H1 : y = β1 +
β2
1 + (x− β4)2/β23
. (27)
The simulation proceeds very much as in the first case, except that
we assume the priors are the same for the two models; this is justifi-
able since each of the parameters has a very similar effect in either
model. We return to the priors later. The decision rule is, accept H1
(the Lorentzian) if the evidence for it is bigger.
Fig. 8 shows examples of fits. Because the models are not
nested, and there is no Ockham factor in play, the odds (at reason-
able signal-to-noise ratios) are much stronger than in the previous
example. Fig. 9 shows the trends of evidence ratio with signal-to-
noise. There is much less spread in this case because it lacks the
c© 2010 RAS, MNRAS 000, 1–11
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Figure 8. This shows a case where a Lorentzian (lower panel) is favoured
over a Gaussian (upper panel) at odds of 60:1. These impressive odds result
from exponentiating small differences in the wings of the lines.
additional variability introduced into the previous example by the
prior on the height of the satellite line.
Fig. 10 shows the Type I error rates and powers in the same
format as before. Performance is better (lower Type I error rate, and
higher power, at the same signal-to-noise ratio), reflecting the fact
that the two models are more distinct. Unlike the previous example,
the BIC gives better power but worse Type I error rate.
Two points emerge that are more specific to the Bayesian con-
text. One is the way we have formulated the decision rule, in terms
of accepting H1. In the double-line example, it is clear than H1 is
the more complex model, and classically we would probably have
focused on whether or not we accepted H0. The decision rule, ‘ac-
cept H0 if the evidence for it is bigger than forH1’ gives a different
power – Type I error rate tradeoff. The same is true for the second
example, where this formulation (accepting the Gaussian, in that
case) gives a much higher power, and much worse Type I error
rate.
The second point relates to the role of priors. There is no Ock-
ham factor at work in the second example – but the odds that arise
seem implausibly large, just looking at the fits. This happens be-
cause in the simulations we fit exactly the right model to the fake
data. A related point is that our model space contains either H0 or
H1 and nothing else. In reality it seems more likely that we would
know H0, the default, null, or starting hypothesis fairly well, but
the alternative might be rather vague Again, this reiterates the les-
son of the Gaussian examples, where we warned against adopting
too restricted a set of models.
We can see the effects of this by a simple change to the Monte
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Figure 9. The evidence ratio, in the sense evidence for H0 / evidence for
H1, for the second line-fitting example, plotted against signal-to-noise ratio.
The red curve assumes H0 is true. The central curve is the median and the
flanking solid lines are the 25th and 75th percentiles. 500 iterations were
used at each noise level. The horizontal lines mark odds on H1 that are
even, e2:1, e3:1 and e4:1.
Carlo modelling. For the case H1 true, we generate the fake data
from the simple Lorentzian. We then fit a more complex model, a
Lorentzian plus a quadratic baseline ax+ bx2. This corresponds to
a case where Nature is simple, but we do not know this. Without
accounting for priors, we find the odds on the Lorentzian model
drop by five orders of magnitude. The factors accounting for the
priors on a and b can recover much of this. For example, if we
think in advance ax + bx2 should be less than the line height (1)
over the range of the data (±10) then we expect the prior range in
a to be ≃ 0.1 and in b to be ≃ 0.01, which allows us to recover
three orders of magnitude in the evidence ratio. The second panel
of Fig. 10 incorporates the nett loss of two orders of magnitude in
the odds for H1, and we see a large effect in the power. The Type
I error rate remains the same because we have not changed H0 in
any way, reflecting its assumed role as the default, better-defined
hypothesis. This part of the example shows how model uncertainty
may play a large role in the quality of decisions made with a limited
suite of options.
5.1 Conclusions from the Monte Carlo examples
The direct simulations clarify some key aspects of the evidence
ratio method. The role of the prior is apparent; uncertainty in
our model parameters can range from sampling noise dominated
(spread in prior values ≫ spread due to measurement error)
through to noise-dominated. The meta-problem of model uncer-
tainty is also illustrated. A spurious restriction of the range of ap-
plicable models is punished by equally bogus levels of certainty.
In this regard, simple goodness-of-fit criteria have much to offer as
complements to formal procedures of model choice.
Treating the evidence ratio as a statistic shows that it has fa-
miliar features. Choosing a ‘decisive’ value, in the face of poor
signal-to-noise ratio or similar models, results in conservative de-
cision procedures with low power to pick alternatives. Really this
is just a reprocessing of the lack of information in the data, but the
evidence ratio encodes this fact in an obscure way. There is no ob-
vious relationship between the posterior odds, the Type I error rate,
or the power: signal-to-noise trumps all of these.
c© 2010 RAS, MNRAS 000, 1–11
10 Jenkins & Peacock
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Type I error rate
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Po
w
er
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Type I error rate
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Po
w
er
Figure 10. The power and Type I error rate for the second line-fitting exam-
ple are shown for signal-to-noise ratios of 40 (topmost line), 35, 30... The
critical ratio varies along each line, with points indicating critical odds on
H0 of e2:1 (red), e3:1 (blue) and e4:1 (green). Grey points are for the sim-
ple case of picking the model with the smaller BIC. The upper diagram has
no quadratic baseline; the lower includes this as a possibility, as described
in the text. Not all signal-to-noise ratios yield curves that lie in the plotted
ranges of power and Type I error rate.
6 WHY DOES THE EVIDENCE RATIO SCATTER SO
MUCH?
We have discussed at length a number of specific examples, which
raise various questions concerning the evidence ratio methodol-
ogy. The common feature has been the large dispersion in the ev-
idence ratio, and the associated poor performance as a statistical
tool for decision making. We now have to ask if our examples are
just pathological cases, or if there is a general reason for the large
scatter in the evidence ratio.
Suppose we are dealing with Gaussian statistics and we are fit-
ting functions y = f(x, ~α) and y = g(x, ~β) to data Yi, with known
noise, at a set of points xi. In the Laplace approximation, the statis-
tics of the evidence ratio are largely dominated by the likelihood
ratio
L = exp
(
− 1
2
χ2( ~α∗)
)
exp
(
− 1
2
χ2( ~β∗)
) , (28)
where the star superscript denotes the maximum likelihood value
of the parameters. The logarithm of this is
− 1
2σ2
(∑
i
(f(xi, ~α∗)− Yi)2 −
∑
i
(g(xi, ~β∗)− Yi)2
)
. (29)
Collecting terms, the contribution at each i to the summation is(
f(xi, ~α∗)
2 − (g(xi, ~β∗)2
)
+
(
2(f(xi, ~α∗)− g(xi, ~β∗))Yi
)
.(30)
If f (for example) is the correct model, then Yi ≃ f(xi, ~α∗) +
Zi, where Zi is a Gaussian variate by assumption. Introducing the
distance h between the models by h(xi, ~α∗, ~β∗) = f(xi, ~α∗) −
g(xi, ~β∗) we see we have a sum of terms in which the stochastic
component is of the form
δ lnL =
∑
i
h(xi, ~α∗, ~β∗)Zi/σ
2, (31)
where σ denotes the rms noise.
We therefore expect the logarithm of the evidence ratio (the
log odds) to have a Gaussian distribution, with the width of this
Gaussian determined by the detail of the distance function h. There
are some special cases where this width might be small. One is
where the ‘incorrect’ model g is just the ‘correct’ model f , plus
some term that is linear in the parameters. This of course would be
true for any pair of linear models where g was a more complicated
version of f . In such a case, h can be small. More generally, if f and
g are nested models, with a parameter that is free to be determined
in f but fixed in g, then h will also be small if the fixed value is
close to the optimum.
In general, however, apart from special cases, we should ex-
pect that the log-odds will have a degree of variance for different
realizations of the data. The extent of the variance will depend on
the details of the models being compared but can be considerable
for commonplace problems. Since the variations in h that will be
consistent with either model will naturally be ∼ σ, this suggests a
scatter in ln E of order unity, as found in our examples.
Finally we note the similarity of this treatment to the classical
likelihood ratio test. In this test, the logarithm of the ratio of max-
imum likelihoods is found to be distributed like chi-square, if the
models are nested. The relevance for us is that here we have a test
statistic that is of very similar form to the evidence ratio, and which
will inevitably show considerable scatter – although the exact de-
gree of scatter must be calculated in individual cases, most simply
by Monte Carlo simulation.
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed the application of the Bayesian evidence ratio
to some simple problems of model selection, which are illustrate
issues encountered in astronomical applications. We have treated
the evidence ratio as a statistic that can be computed for a given
dataset. Using analytical arguments and Monte Carlo simulation,
we have investigated the distribution of evidence ratio values that
results from an ensemble of experiments. Although the Bayesian
approach treats the data as given, our data are but one sample of
a range of possibilities. The evidence ratio calculation indeed as-
sumes that we know the distribution of the data, so a calculation
that incorporates this random element is always possible. All ex-
periments could in principle be repeated (even the single datum of
our Universe, if we accept the Landscape picture – e.g. Susskind
2003).
In the examples we have investigated, we find that the evi-
dence ratio has a large dispersion about its ensemble average, and
we have given arguments to suggest that such behaviour is likely to
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be general. We therefore suggest that one should compute not only
the value of E , but also its distribution.
Of course, at any one time, we have to work with the data that
exist, and nothing that we write here should be taken as challeng-
ing the fundamental Bayesian paradigm: modulo the often unjustly
neglected priors on model classes, the evidence ratio does express
our full knowledge of the relative odds on different models. But
when one moves beyond this statement to a decision (the evidence
is large enough, so I will build a factory to produce a new drug, or I
will launch a new Great Observatory), then we need to know more
about the evidence than a single numerical value.
This point is of particular importance in calculations that at-
tempt to predict the potential decisiveness of future experiments, as
in e.g. Heavens et al. (2007) or Trotta (2007b). The expected evi-
dence ratio for a given experiment, 〈E〉, is an interesting quantity
to know – but one may not want to choose an experimental strategy
that maximises this quantity, if the price is an increased scatter.
The ‘noisy’ nature of the evidence ratio has a number of im-
plications. At the practical level, there is a limit to how much effort
it is worth investing in numerical algorithms for accurate computa-
tion of the evidence ratio: arguably, there is no point in evaluating
E to better than a factor of 2 numerical precision. The Laplace ap-
proximation may be useful here, as may judicious use of approxi-
mate combinations of models (sometimes called ‘toy’ models, al-
though this term can be an injustice).
Most seriously, the scatter in E means that it is inevitable that
a good fraction of experiments will fail to find decisive evidence
in favour of a more complex model, even when it is true (a large
‘Type II’ error rate, or low power). In such cases, do we accept that
the simpler model is still an acceptable description of the data? The
problem with this conclusion is that performance of the evidence
ratio when viewed as a statistic seems to be asymmetric between
Type I and Type II errors. There may well exist levels of evidence
that are far from being decisively in favour of a complex model
(E ∼ 1), and are yet close to impossible on a simpler model. It such
circumstances, it hardly seems sensible to persist with the simple
model.
This reasoning is certainly reminiscent of the current con-
troversy over whether a scale-invariant spectrum of cosmological
mass fluctuations is ruled out (only moderate evidence in favour of
tilted models ln E = 2.8, according to Trotta 2007a, even though
the observed deviation from n = 1 is ‘3.3σ’). It would be inter-
esting to study this situation using the approach of Monte Carlo
realizations that we have advocated here, to see what the evidence
ratio is really telling us.
In such circumstances, where the evidence ratio fails to dis-
criminate clearly between alternative models, and yet the avail-
able data are a poor match to the null model, we have to ques-
tion whether the problem is correctly formulated. While the null
hypothesis will normally be rather specific, the alternative can be
vague, and difficult to reduce to a single model (a point made by
Efstathiou 2008 in his critique of the evidence ratio approach). But
if the null model gives a poor fit to the data to hand, we have good
reason to believe that we need another model, even if the the evi-
dence ratio is unable to convince us that this must be the supplied
alternative. The strength of the Bayesian approach is that it focuses
our attention on the actual models we are considering. But with-
out a goodness-of-fit test, the result may simply demonstrate that
we lack the imagination to create a sufficiently exhaustive set of
models.
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